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Abstract
The ethical standards governing conflicts of interest disclosure requirements for arbitrators and mediators are
numerous and varied. In spite of the considerable attention that conflict of interest questions attract, both the
extent to which an arbitrator must disclose past, present, and potential conflicts of interest and the
consequences of a failure to make an appropriate disclosure remain unclear. This article examines disclosure
requirements themselves, as well as the sanctions and penalties that may result from a failure to disclose
information concerning a neutral's impartiality. Particular attention is paid to what generally is regarded as the
most extreme consequence of failure; that being, vacatur.
Much of the confusion regarding disclosure requirements results from the fact that it is not always clear which
conflict of interest and disclosure standard is controlling. Relevant standards include arbitral associations'
codes of conduct, local codes of ethics, statutes, rules of professional conduct, and judicial decisions. The
existing myriad of relevant guidance, regulations, and judicial decisions concerning conflicts of interest and
required disclosures can lead arbitrators to make choices that conceivably result not only in sanctions but the
nuclear option of the arbitral world, vacatur. Arbitral institutions, such as the American Arbitration
Association and the National Arbitration Forum, have not been sufficiently careful to ensure that their codes,
standards, and bills of rights do not articulate inconsistent standards as to what conflicts of interest must be
disclosed and the consequences of both disclosure (possible removal) and failure to disclose (sanctions and
vacatur).
A cynic might assert that in an apparent effort to assure potential clients that their arbitration services are as
credible, ethical, and trustworthy as any other dispute resolution process, arbitral institutions have
aggressively incorporated every available, recognized external ethics code or codes of conduct (such as judicial
codes and local ethics codes) into the arbitral association's own code. A more forgiving commentator might
reply that the associations are incorporating external codes because those codes generally have been in
existence for a significant period of time, have undergone intense scrutiny, and can help achieve the arbitral
association's goal of providing reliable and ethical services. Adopting and incorporating external codes that
may have been drafted to regulate services other than arbitration, however, can create obligations inconsistent
with the arbitral association's own codes and incompatible with the goals and realities of arbitration.
A call for the courts to adopt a more uniform standard for determining when a failure to disclose a conflict of
interest will result in evident partiality warranting vacatur may not be answered any time soon. But there is no
reason why arbitral institutions cannot review and, if necessary, amend their own codes and recommendations
to ensure that their expectations concerning conflict of interest and disclosures are defined as clearly as
possible.
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The ethical standards governing conflicts of interest disclosure
requirements for arbitrators and mediators are numerous and varied.1
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attract, both the extent to which an arbitrator must disclose past,
present, and potential conflicts of interest and the consequences of a
failure to make an appropriate disclosure remain unclear.2 This article
will examine disclosure requirements themselves, as well as the
sanctions and penalties that may result from a failure to disclose
information concerning a neutral's impartiality. Particular attention
will be paid to what generally is regarded as the most extreme
consequence of failure; that being, vacatur.
Much of the confusion regarding disclosure requirements results
from the fact that it is not always clear which conflict of interest and
disclosure standard is controlling.' Relevant standards include arbitral
associations' codes of conduct, local codes of ethics, statutes, rules of
professional conduct, and judicial decisions.' The existing myriad of
relevant guidance, regulations, and judicial decisions concerning
conflicts of interest and required disclosures can lead arbitrators to
make choices that conceivably result not only in sanctions but the
nuclear option of the arbitral world, vacatur. Arbitral institutions,
such as the American Arbitration Association and the National
Arbitration Forum, have not been sufficiently careful to ensure that
their codes, standards, and bills of rights do not articulate inconsistent
standards as to what conflicts of interest must be disclosed and the
consequences of both disclosure (possible removal) and failure to
disclose (sanctions and vacatur).
A cynic might assert that in an apparent effort to assure potential
clients that their arbitration services are as credible, ethical, and
trustworthy as any other dispute resolution process, arbitral
institutions have aggressively incorporated every available, recognized
external ethics code or codes of conduct (such as judicial codes and
local ethics codes) into the arbitral association's own code. A more
forgiving commentator might reply that the associations are
incorporating external codes because those codes generally have been
in existence for a significant period of time, have undergone intense
scrutiny, and can help achieve the arbitral association's goal of
providing reliable and ethical services. Adopting and incorporating
external codes that may have been drafted to regulate services other
than arbitration, however, can create obligations inconsistent with the
arbitral association's own codes and incompatible with the goals and
realities of arbitration.
2. See infra Parts I, II.G.
3. See infra Part I.G.
4. See infra Part II.
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A call for the courts to adopt a more uniform standard for
determining when a failure to disclose a conflict of interest will result
in evident partiality warranting vacatur may not be answered any time
soon. But there is no reason why arbitral institutions cannot review
and, if necessary, amend their own codes and recommendations to
ensure that their expectations concerning conflict of interest and
disclosures are defined as clearly as possible.
Part I will address the statutory standards for vacatur established
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and analyze how these
standards can be applied when a neutral fails to make an adequate
disclosure. More specifically, the article will explore how a court may
decide whether a proceeding was tainted by "evident partiality" in
light of prior cases that have provided standards for evaluating
neutral's ethical behavior.
Part II will address the broad range of consequences for non-
disclosure, including vacatur, which are permitted under the various
ethical codes and standards governing neutrals and present a detailed
review of the specific rules that provide the basis for such action. In an
effort to clarify the operative standards for vacatur due to non-
disclosure, the article will conclude with a review of several
contemporary cases. In these cases the claimant sought vacatur of an
arbitration award, with and without success, on the grounds that an
arbitrator's failure to disclose a conflict of interest was evident
partiality.
Before investing too much time and energy analyzing conflicts of
interest and disclosure requirements, however, one should pause and
ask whether at this point in time there still are sufficient unresolved
questions to justify the investment. Are conflicts of interest questions
and disclosure requirements still so unsettled that they warrant a
detailed inquiry and analysis or can these concerns be handled rather
simply? In other words, do the issues surrounding conflicts of interest
and disclosure requirements amount to a mountain or a molehill?
On the one hand, it can be argued that we only are dealing with a
rather simple problem, nothing more than a molehill on the arbitral
landscape. All an arbitrator has to do is disclose every imaginable
connection that he or she has with a case-end of problem, end of
story.
On the other hand, not unlike many things in life, this instruction
may be easier said than done. A neutral can be connected to the
parties or substantive issues in a case in a surprising number of ways.
Possible connections include past, present and possible future
relationships with the parties or associated persons/entities. Or the
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neutral, his or her family, close friends or business associates may
have either an immediate or potential interest in the outcome. Can
we, realistically, disclose every possible connection? What happens if
we cannot, or choose not, to disclose every conceivable connection?
What if we simply forget? Are there any conflicts to which parties
cannot consent no matter how thoroughly they are informed-does
party autonomy have its limits? While the general concepts underlying
disclosure requirements are comprehensible, the devil is in the details.
There are three primary reasons to conclude that the issue of
disclosure is, in fact, a mountain. First, there is a risk of vacatur under
the FAA.5 Although the bases for vacatur under this law are not
entirely predictable, it is conceivable that a failure to disclose could
result in vacatur where that failure creates an appearance of partiality
or bias from either the subjective perspective of a losing party or the
objective perspective of a reasonable person. We know that an entire
case can be vacated because the arbitrator did not make a required
disclosure.6 Because we do not know whether a case will be vacated
only when a conflict of interest reasonably created an unfavorable
appearance of partiality or bias or whenever the conflict creates the
appearance of bias, we are looking at a mountain. Second, the risk of
vacatur may extend to situations in which the arbitrator fails to follow
applicable ethical codes requiring disclosure under certain
circumstances The problem is that we do always know in advance
which codes will be controlling. Finally, a failure to disclose may
present a risk of sanctions for the arbitrator personally.8 It is daunting,
to say the least, to realize that you may be subject to sanctions when it
is difficult to determine exactly what is required by the myriad of
relevant codes, rules, statutes and judicial decisions.
I. VACATUR OR THE "WAFAA"-THE NUCLEAR OPTION
Arguably, the worst possible result that could ensue from an
arbitrator's failure to disclose a conflict of interest is vacatur of the
final arbitration award.9 The acronym WAFAA, or Worst Alternative
5. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (Supp. V 2005).
6. See, e.g., Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi,
A.S., No. 05 CV 10540(RPP), 2006 WL 1816383, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2006).
7. See id. (vacating the arbitral award because arbitrator failed to disclose, as
required under the American Arbitration Association's Code of Ethics, the IBA
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, and the Submission
Agreement entered into by the parties).
8. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., CODE OF ETHICS R. III.
9. See, e.g., Ovalar, 2006 WL 1816383, at *9 (demonstrating the harsh consequence
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to a Final Arbitration Award, is a variation on the WATNA (Worst
Alternative to Negotiated Agreement) concept. It captures concisely
the potentially catastrophic consequences of failing to disclose.
The United States Arbitration Act of 1925, better known as the
Federal Arbitration Act or FAA, was established to provide
arbitration with the protection necessary to be an attractive and
reliable adjudicatory option.' ° As such, the grounds to vacate an
arbitration award are limited. Section 10(a) provides:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration-
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
Notably, there is no express language within the statute
addressing an arbitrator's failure to disclose conflicts of interest or
relationships. However, in the case of Applied Industrial Materials
Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York vacated an
arbitration award based upon a violation of disclosure requirements in
the submission agreement executed by the parties, the International
of vacatur of an arbitral award for an arbitrator's failure to disclose a conflict of interest).
10. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000 & Supp. 2005). The Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) was originally passed to address two significant problems within American courts.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984). The first was a historical reluctance on
the part of English judges to allow arbitration of disputes resulting from a desire on their
part to avoid a loss of jurisdiction. Id. at 13. This attitude was integrated into English
common law and was eventually adopted by the American courts. Id. The second problem
addressed by the passage of the FAA was the inability of state arbitration statutes to
adequately enforce arbitration agreements, and thereby ensure that the expectations of
those individuals who preferred arbitration would not be undermined by state or federal
courts. Id. The FAA has established a liberal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
11. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (Supp. V 2005).
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Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration, and the American Arbitration Association's Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. 2 Despite the district
court's reliance on various ethics codes to support vacating the
arbitration award, on July 9, 2007, the Second Circuit affirmed by
engaging in an "evident partiality" analysis grounded only in section
10 of the FAA and the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.3 The
court held that "when an arbitrator knows of a potential conflict, a
failure to either investigate or disclose an intention not to investigate
is indicative of evident partiality."14
Despite the Second Circuit's holding in Ovalar, there remains the
question of when a court will vacate an award under section 10 of the
FAA. Because the four statutory grounds do not provide substantive
bases for vacatur, the possibility of a merits-based review is
eliminated. The limited number of acceptable grounds and their
content, however, do affirm the statutory policy favoring enforcement
and suggest that judicial relief is available only when the arbitral
proceeding was manifestly unfair and arbitrator abuse characterized
the proceeding. Based upon this analysis, it is not clear which, if any,
provisions of section 10(a) would be satisfied by an arbitrator's failure
to disclose.
The first provision permits vacatur "where the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.' 5 Meeting this
standard would require wholesale illegitimacy, such as bribery, threats
of violence, or other forms of intimidation. As such, it is unlikely, but
not impossible, that a failure to disclose would satisfy the first ground
for vacatur. Prior cases have suggested that violation of this provision
demands a corruption of the entire process through 'undue means'
rather than requiring a completely disinterested evaluation. For
example, in Superadio Ltd. Partnership v. Winstar Radio Productions,
LLC, the Massachusetts Supreme Court defined "undue means" as
"an underhanded, conniving, or unlawful manner" in holding that an
12. See Ovalar, 2006 WL 1816383, at *9; see generally IBA GUIDELINES ON
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION (2004), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Arbitration guidelines_2007.pdf; AAA/ABA
CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial-disputes.pdf.
13. See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S.,
492 F.3d 132, 136-39 (2d Cir. 2007); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393
U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).
14. Ovalar, 492 F.3d at 138.
15. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
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arbitration award could not be vacated due to one party's
representation by an attorney who was not licensed in the State of
Massachusetts. 6
Likewise, failure to disclose a conflict of interest does not appear
to implicate the first portion of the third provision of section 10(a),
which permits vacatur "where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing.., or... hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy."17 Nor does a
failure to disclose constitute a situation in which the arbitrators have
"exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award ... was not made"-thus eliminating
the fourth provision as a basis for vacatur as well.'8
Thus, we are left with two provisions under which a court might
justify vacatur of an arbitration award under the FAA based upon a
failure to disclose. The second ground listed in the FAA prohibits
"evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators" (as distinguished
from the corruption described in the first ground which implicates
illegitimacy of the process itself), and the latter portion of the third
provision enables a court to vacate an arbitration award for "any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced."19 In addition to the statutory grounds for vacatur, several
judicially-created grounds for vacatur have been established beyond
the scope of the FAA." These include situations in which the court
finds a manifest disregard of the law and those where the arbitration
award is counter to, or against, public policy." Neither of these
options represents likely grounds for vacatur when the allegation is a
failure to disclose. A review of the applicable case law suggests that
"evident partiality" is where the courts hang their hats.
Courts may take a variety of approaches when determining
whether vacatur is appropriate based upon an evident partiality
analysis. One possibility is that the mere "appearance of bias" is
sufficient to establish evident partiality, and thus, the arbitrator must
disclose all actual and potential conflicts.2 A second approach
requires that the arbitrator disclose only those relationships that
16. Superadio Ltd. P'ship v. Winstar Radio Prods., LLC, 844 N.E.2d 246, 252 (Mass.
2006).
17. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).
18. Id. § 10(a)(4).
19. Id. § 10(a)(2)-(3).
20. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 119 F.3d 847, 849
(10th Cir. 1997).
21. Id.
22. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968).
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would cause bias in the eyes of a "reasonable person."23 Yet another
possibility would permit a finding of evident partiality where the
arbitrator does not comply with an ethics code that has explicit
disclosure requirements such as the California Ethics Standards for
Neutral Arbitrators.24 Finally, a court might consider the approach
taken by the International Bar Association and classify certain
conflicts as non-waivable such that even disclosure cannot restore the
integrity of the arbitration proceeding.25
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth
Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. provides additional
guidance to those attempting to predict whether a court will vacate
based upon evident partiality.26  The Commonwealth decision
addressed the case of a sub-contractor who sought payment from the
prime contractor for work on a painting project.27 Unbeknownst to the
sub-contractor, one of the three arbitrators selected to resolve the
dispute was a local engineering consultant who had regularly done
business with the prime contractor in the years preceding the
arbitration.28 Although the consultant's fees obtained from the prime
contractor were valued at only $12,000 and there had been no dealings
between the two parties in the year immediately preceding the
arbitration, the plurality opinion asserted that "[s]ection 10 does
authorize vacation of an award where it was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means or [w]here there was evident partiality.., in
the arbitrators. These provisions show a desire of Congress to provide
23. Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Tatung Co., 379 F.3d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 2004).
24. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9 (West 2007). The statute provides:
(a) In any arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement, when a person is
to serve as a neutral arbitrator, the proposed neutral arbitrator shall disclose
all matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably
entertain a doubt that the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be
impartial ....
(b) Subject only to the disclosure requirements of law, the proposed neutral
arbitrator shall disclose all matters required to be disclosed pursuant to this
section to all parties in writing within 10 calendar days of service of notice of
the proposed nomination or appointment.
Id. (emphasis added).
25. See IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 20 (2004), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Arbitrationguidelines-2007.pdf (listing various
non-waivable conflicts such as "an identity between a party and the arbitrator" and where
the "arbitrator has a significant financial interest in one of the parties or the outcome of
the case").
26. Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 147.
27. Id. at 146.
28. Id.
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not merely for any arbitration but for an impartial one."29
The plurality based its decision in part upon an earlier case,
Tumey v. Ohio, which clarified the requirement of judicial impartiality
in the context of a criminal conviction.' In Tumey, the Court held that
a conviction may be set aside in cases where there is "the slightest
pecuniary interest" on the part of the presiding judge.3 In setting aside
Tumey's conviction, the Court "rejected the... contention that the
compensation involved there was 'so small that it is not to be regarded
as likely to influence improperly a judicial officer in the discharge of
his duty."'32 The Commonwealth Court reasoned that the same
constitutional principle requiring impartiality on the part of judges
could be found in the statutory text of the FAA allowing an award to
be vacated "on the basis of evident partiality or the use of undue
means."33 While the plurality noted that "arbitrators cannot sever all
their ties with the business world," the Court asserted that "we should,
if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of
arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free rein to
decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate
review.""
While Justices White and Marshall were supportive of the Court's
decision, the concurring opinion highlighted key differences between
the roles of judge and arbitrator. Justice White emphasized that "[t]he
Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the
standards of judicial decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any
judges" and noted that "[i]t is often because they are men of affairs,
not apart from but of the marketplace, that they are effective in their
adjudicatory function."35 Because of the unique expertise arbitrators
often bring to the arbitral forum, "arbitrators are not automatically
disqualified by a business relationship with the parties before them if
both parties are informed of the relationship in advance, or if they are
unaware of the facts but the relationship is trivial."36 Noting that the
judiciary should play a minimal role in evaluating the impartiality of
arbitrators and also emphasizing the practical difficulties associated
with requiring an arbitrator to provide "his complete and
29. Id. at 146-47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927).
31. Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
32. Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 148 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 524).
33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at 148-49.
35. Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
36. Id.
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unexpurgated business biography,"37 Justice White attempted to
clarify the Court's holding by stating that "where the arbitrator has a
substantial interest in a firm which has done more than trivial business
with a party, that fact must be disclosed."38 He went on to suggest that
arbitrators should err on the side of disclosure to avoid creating a
situation in which it is difficult for courts to determine whether the
undisclosed conflicts are sufficiently material to permit vacatur.i9
The dissenting opinion authored by Justice Fortas placed great
emphasis on the claimant's failure to allege bias or partiality on the
part of the challenged arbitrator in support of his motion to vacate the
award. Specifically, the dissenting Justices rejected what they
interpreted as a rule that would permit vacatur based upon a finding
of "evident partiality" where there was an "innocent failure to
volunteer information" without consideration of the surrounding
circumstances. 4° "'Evident partiality' means what it says: conduct-or
at least an attitude or disposition-by the arbitrator favoring one party
rather than the other.",41 Justice Fortas concluded by asserting that "to
rule otherwise may be a palpable injustice, since all agree that the
arbitrator [in the instant case] was innocent of either 'evident
partiality' or anything approaching it.
42
A detailed analysis of the various opinions set forth by the Court
in Commonwealth thus still leaves those attempting to define the
boundaries of 'evident partiality' with multiple interpretations from
which to choose. While the plurality opinion clearly supports a
standard under which the arbitrator must avoid the mere appearance
of bias, which entails a "simple requirement that arbitrators disclose
to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible
bias,"43 the plurality opinion is not binding without the concurrence,
which requires more than the mere appearance of bias to justify
vacatur. 4 Taking both opinions together, the resulting rule supports
an objective standard, under which disclosure is required only when a
reasonable person would conclude that the arbitrator was biased.45
Despite the Court's decision in Commonwealth, differing views persist
with respect to whether an arbitrator is required to disclose all actual
37. Id. at 151.
38. Id. at 151-52.
39. Id. at 152.
40. Id. at 154 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 149 (plurality opinion).
44. Id. at 150-52 (White, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 148-51 (plurality and concurring opinions).
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and potential conflicts, or only those conflicts that permit a reasonable
person to infer bias.'
Related to the question of when vacatur is appropriate under the
FAA is the issue of whether parties to an arbitration agreement may
contract to expand the grounds upon which an arbitration award may
be vacated. In March 2008, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. The case involved a lease
dispute in which the arbitration agreement executed by the parties
included a provision requiring the court to "vacate, modify or correct
any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of facts are not
supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's
conclusions of law are erroneous., 47 Although several circuit courts of
appeal previously held the grounds for judicial review provided in
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA represented threshold provisions open
to expansion by the parties, ' the majority concluded that a natural
reading of the language of sections 9 through 11 indicated that the
grounds for expedited vacatur and modification of an arbitration
award were exclusive.49
The Court reasoned that the "must grant.., unless" structure of
section 9, which commands the courts to confirm an arbitration award
unless there exist grounds for vacatur or modification specified within
sections 10 and 11, respectively, suggests that Congress did not intend
to give the parties flexibility to determine their own grounds for
judicial review." Furthermore, Justice Souter appeared to reject a
construction of sections 10 and 11 that permits the parties to compel
judicial review of an award based upon a mistake of law, as the parties
did in this case, and thereby equate such an error with the established
grounds for vacatur of fraud, corruption, and evident partiality."
Asserting that an exclusive interpretation would "substantiat[e] a
national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review
needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway," the Court noted, "[a]ny other reading opens the door
to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can 'rende[r]
46. See id. at 148-52.
47. Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 06-989, 2008 WL 762537, at *3
(U.S. Mar. 25, 2008).
48. Id. at *4 n.5.
49. Id. at *6-7.
50. Id. at *6. "There is nothing malleable about 'must grant,' which unequivocally
tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases, except when one of the 'prescribed'
exceptions applies. This does not sound remotely like a provision meant to tell a court
what to do just in case the parties say nothing else." Id.
51. Id. ("'Fraud' and a mistake of law are not cut from the same cloth.").
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informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and
time-consuming judicial review process,' and bring arbitration theory
to grief in post-arbitration process."52 Notably, the Court limited its
holding to arbitration awards subject to review under the FAA and
declined to address other means of obtaining judicial review of
arbitration awards pursuant to state statutory or common law. 3
Regardless of which standard applies, however, a review of the
relevant cases makes clear that the court's decision often will be based
upon a fact-intensive analysis. In Schmitz v. Zilveti, the court vacated
an award where the arbitrator failed to investigate his law firm's
earlier relationship with a party's corporate parent. ' Thus, even where
no actual conflict of interest exists, because the arbitrator had no
actual knowledge of the relationship, a "reasonable impression of
partiality" can still form.5 Conversely, in Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Local 1643, United Mine Workers of America, the court asserted that
partiality must be "direct, definite, and capable of demonstration
rather than remote, uncertain or speculative. ' 6 The appellate court
further held that the district court's finding that the union's
employment of the arbitrator's brother constituted bias per se was
clearly erroneous and more evidence of partiality and improper
motive was required to justify vacatur 7 More recently, in Positive
Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., the Fifth
Circuit held the "draconian remedy of vacatur is only warranted upon
nondisclosure that involves a significant compromising relationship"
and upheld the challenged award, despite the arbitrator's failure to
disclose that he and the attorney for one of the parties had previously
represented the same entity, in an unrelated matter taking place over
58seven years ago .
A review of case law, statutory language, and legislative history
suggests several principles that determine whether a court will vacate
52. Id. at *7 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache
T Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003)).
53. Id. at *8 (explaining that the decision "speak[s] only to the scope of the
expeditious judicial review under §§ 9, 10, and 11, [and] decid[es] nothing about other
possible avenues for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards").
54. Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043,1049 (9th Cir. 1994).
55. Id. at 1049.
56. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers of Am., 48 F.3d 125,
129 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Peoples Sec. Life Ins. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141,
145 (4th Cir. 1993)).
57. Id.
58. Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278,
286 (5th Cir. 2007).
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an arbitration award for failure to disclose a conflict of interest. First,
a court will consider vacatur if the failure to disclose creates "evident
partiality" where "evident partiality" may be defined as either the
mere appearance of bias or any bias that would be perceived by a
reasonable person. 9 Second, the application of an "evident partiality"
analysis must not undermine the goals of the FAA, namely to ensure
that arbitration is fast, efficient, and not subject to delay and
obstruction in the courts.' Third, a court considering vacatur of an
arbitration award must consider and give due respect to the tradeoff
between impartiality and expertise that inheres in a system that allows
industry professionals to participate in the resolution of industry-
specific disputes.61 In fact, most courts are mindful of this tradeoff and
have imposed a higher burden on those seeking to vacate awards on
grounds of arbitrator interests or relationships.62
Another guiding principle that emerges when reviewing the
relevant cases in this area involves the duty to investigate potential
conflicts of interest. As with the duty to disclose, there is a split of
authority regarding the implications of a failure to investigate.63 Some
courts have held that vacatur is permissible where the arbitrator fails
to investigate, and thus does not discover the problematic conflict or
relationship, but still is deemed to have constructive knowledge of the
conflict. For example, in Schmitz the court asserted that "an arbitrator
may have a duty to investigate independent of its.., duty to disclose.
A violation of this independent duty to investigate may result in a
failure to disclose that creates a reasonable impression of
partiality... ." In evaluating the impact of Schmitz, however, it is
important to note that the court's decision relied in part upon the
National Association of Securities Dealers' (NASD) Code of
Arbitration Procedures, which requires arbitrators to investigate
59. Id. at 282-83.
60. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967)
(asserting that the "unmistakably clear congressional purpose [of the FAA was] that the
arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject
to delay and obstruction in the courts").
61. Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983).
62. See, e.g., id. (requiring circumstances that are "powerfully suggestive of bias" to
justify vacatur); Artists & Craftsmen Builders, Ltd. v. Schapiro, 648 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551
(App. Div. 1996) (stating that though an award may be overturned on proof of appearance
of bias or partiality, party seeking to vacate has heavy burden and must show prejudice).
63. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that an
arbitrator has a duty to investigate independent of his duty to disclose); AI-Harbi v.
Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that an arbitrator has no duty to
investigate).
64. Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048.
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potential conflicts of interest.65
Conversely, in Al-Harbi v. Citibank, the court refused to vacate
an arbitration award despite the arbitrator's failure to disclose a
potential conflict of interest. In doing so, the court distinguished
Schmitz because the relevant dispute was not arbitrated under the
NASD Code and because "the alleged evident partiality [arose] ...
from [one party's] representation in unrelated matters by a firm with
which [the arbitrator's] only continuing connection was... an interest
in receivables, none of which were generated by any party connected
with the arbitration."66 The court went on to state:
[T]he fact that an arbitrator has not conducted an investigation
sufficient to uncover the existence of facts marginally
disclosable under the Commonwealth Coatings duty is not
sufficient to warrant vacating an arbitration award for evident
partiality. That is, we explicitly hold that there is no duty on an
arbitrator to make any such investigation.
67
In addition to the grounds for vacatur and related disclosure
requirements derived from the FAA, the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act (RUAA) provides another set of standards that must
be considered in our analysis of the issues surrounding disclosure and
conflicts of interest. With respect to the duty to investigate addressed
by the Schmitz and Al-Harbi decisions, the comments to section 12 of
the RUAA state that:
Section 12(a) requires an arbitrator to make a "reasonable
inquiry" prior to accepting an appointment as to any potential
conflict of interests.... Once an arbitrator has made a
"reasonable inquiry" as required by Section 12(a), the arbitrator
will be required to disclose only "known facts" that might affect
impartiality. The term "knowledge" (which is intended to
include "known") is defined in Section 1(4) to mean "actual
knowledge."68
Thus, unlike the court in Schmitz, which found constructive
knowledge of a conflict sufficient to justify vacatur, the RUAA does
65. Id. at 1049. The court explained:
Section 23(a) & (b) of the NASD Code requires arbitrators to "make a
reasonable effort to inform themselves of any" "existing or past financial,
business, [or] professional ... relationships [that they or their employer,
partners, or business associates may have] that are likely to affect
impartiality or might reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias."
Id.
66. Al-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 682-83.
67. Id. at 683.
68. UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr § 12 cmt. 3 (2000).
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not penalize the arbitrator for failure to disclose relationships of
which he or she has no actual knowledge.
For those states that adopt the provisions of the RUAA, the
prefatory comments suggest that it is likely the grounds for vacatur
provided in section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act will preempt
comparable state laws.69 The parties to an arbitration proceeding,
however, may execute a clearly expressed contractual agreement to
proceed under state law so long as the law does not conflict with the
FAA's pro-arbitration prime directive.7" Under these circumstances, it
is less likely that the disclosure standards provided in section 12 of the
RUAA will be preempted.
In addition to the portions of section 12(a) imposing a duty to
investigate and limiting required disclosures to information within the
actual knowledge of the arbitrator, there are other provisions of the
RUAA that are relevant to a discussion of disclosure requirements
and grounds for vacatur-these include sections 4(b)(3), 11(b), and
the remainder of section 12.
Section 4(b)(3) defines the circumstances under which the
disclosure requirements provided in section 12 may be waived or
preempted by disclosure requirements codified in the ethical
standards of a professional organization such as the American
Arbitration Association. Specifically, this section mandates that a
party may not "agree to unreasonably restrict the right under Section
12 to disclosure of any facts by a neutral arbitrator."71 The related
comment explains that this provision is intended to recognize that
while the actions of parties to an arbitration proceeding are often
governed by disclosure requirements established by an arbitration
organization, these requirements are controlling only to the extent
that they are "reasonable in what they require a neutral arbitrator to
disclose.7 2 In addition, the comment to section 4 clarifies that the
69. Id., prefatory note. "[T]he Supreme Court's unequivocal stand to date as to the
preemptive effect of the FAA provides strong reason to believe that a similar result will
obtain with regard to Section 10(a) grounds for vacatur." Id.
70. Id. ("Volt and Mastrobuono establish that a clearly expressed contractual
agreement... to conduct.., arbitration under state law rules effectively trumps the
preemptive effect of the FAA ... [provided] the state law principles invoked by the choice-
of-law provision do not conflict with the FAA's prime directive that agreements to
arbitrate be enforced."). See also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472-79 (1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
514 U.S. 52, 57-64 (1995).
71. UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 4(b)(3).
72. Id. § 4 cmt. 4b. It is highly unlikely that a court would find an arbitration
organization's disclosure rules unreasonable solely based upon whether that organization
requires disclosures only of those conflicts that reasonably create an impression of bias or
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parties may waive their right to disclosure under section 12 for non-
neutral arbitrators selected by the parties.73
Section 11 defines who may validly serve as a neutral arbitrator
under the terms of the RUAA. Section 11(b) requires that "[a]n
individual who has a known, direct, and material interest in the
outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and
substantial relationship with a party may not serve as an arbitrator
required by an agreement to be neutral. ' '74 The comments explain that
an award granted by an arbitrator who fails to disclose such a
relationship will be subjected to a presumption of vacatur pursuant to
sections 12(e) and 23(a)(2) of the RUAA. 7 An arbitrator who
discloses such a relationship but continues to serve despite a timely
objection by a party will be subject to vacatur under sections 12(c) and
23(a)(2) of the RUAA.76  The prohibition against arbitrators
continuing to serve when they have serious conflicts of interest such as
those described in section 11(b) is comparable to the International
Bar Association's list of non-waivable conflicts (also known as the
Non-Waivable Red List) that the IBA has deemed incurable, even
where the improper relationship is disclosed to the parties.77
Section 12 and the accompanying comments delineate the
disclosures required by an arbitrator under the RUAA. This section
demands disclosure of "any known facts that a reasonable person
would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in the
arbitration proceeding., 78 In addition, sections 12(c) and (d) specify
that the failure to make a required disclosure or actual disclosure
followed by continued service as a neutral may result in vacatur if a
party objects to the conflict or relationship.79 Section 12(e) goes even
further and declares that an arbitrator who fails to disclose a personal
or financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding or a substantial
relationship with the parties will be "presumed to act with evident
instead any conflict that creates an impression of bias.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 11(b).
75. Id. § 11 cmt. 2.
76. Id.
77. See IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION 20
(2004), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Arbitration-guidelines_2007.pdf.
78. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12(a). The disclosures required under section 12(a)
include: "(1) a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding;
and (2) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the agreement to arbitrate
or the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a witness, or another
arbitrators [sic]." Id.
79. Id. § 12(c)-(d).
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partiality," making vacatur mandatory upon motion to the court by a
party to the arbitral proceeding. °
The comments accompanying section 12 describe the principles
that guided the Drafting Committee in defining the disclosure
requirements under the RUAA. The comments explain that the
affirmative disclosure requirements provided in section 12 are
intended to ensure that the parties to the arbitration are given access
to "all information that might reasonably affect the potential
arbitrator's neutrality."8 The Drafting Committee modeled the
RUAA disclosure standards in part after the AAA/ABA Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes adopted in 1977, which
espouse an objective standard of partiality under which "arbitrators
should disclose the existence of any interests or relationships which
are likely to affect their impartiality or which might reasonably create
the appearance of partiality or bias."82 In fact, the drafters intentionally
chose to modify an initial requirement to disclose "any" interest or
relationship and elected instead to use the phrases "'a' financial or
personal interest in the outcome or 'an' existing or past relationship"
in order to avoid requiring arbitrators to disclose de minimis interests
and relationships that would be unlikely to affect partiality.83 The
comments reject an understanding of evident partiality based upon
tenuous connections among the arbitrator and the parties, asserting
that "[tihe fundamental standard of Section 12(a) is an objective one:
disclosure is required of facts that a reasonable person would consider
likely to affect the arbitrator's impartiality in the arbitration
proceeding."'
II. NONDISCLOSURE HAS ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCES BUT
WHERE Do WE FIND THE RULES?
Vacatur is not the only regrettable consequence that may result
from a failure to disclose a conflict of interest. Sanctions and penalties
may affect an arbitrator personally.85 But it can be difficult to
determine which rules and regulations are controlling and exactly
what those rules require.
One critical protection available to arbitrators, however, is
80. Id. §§ 12(e), 23(a)(2).
81. Id. § 12 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 12 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
85. See generally L & H Airco, Inc. v. Rapistan Corp., 446 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. 1989).
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arbitral immunity. Statutory and case law authority supports the
conclusion that arbitral immunity is not jeopardized by a failure to
disclose relevant conflicts of interest. In L & H Airco, Inc. v. Rapistan
Corp., the Minnesota Supreme Court explained its justifications for
protecting arbitral immunity in cases of nondisclosure holding that:
Failure to disclose possible conflicts of interest creates at the
least an impression of bias. An impression of bias contaminates
the decision making process when neutrality is essential and is
not condoned by this court. Nevertheless, we decline to permit a
civil suit against the arbitrator for failure to disclose prior
business or social contacts because of our policy of encouraging
arbitration and of protecting the independence of the decision
made. Permitting civil suit for a lapse in disclosure would chill
the willingness of arbitrators to serve because of the difficulty of
remembering all contacts, however remote, with parties to the
arbitration.
In addition, the RUAA provides that failure to make a required
disclosure does not cause any loss of immunity on the part of the
arbitrator and suggests that vacatur is the appropriate remedy for
nondisclosure. 7
Although it seems fairly clear that arbitral immunity will remain
intact in the event of a failure to disclose, in order to determine what
else could happen one must examine the multitude of ethical codes
and standards that address disclosure and conflicts of interest. A
variety of organizations have attempted to define the ethical standards
applicable to arbitrators including, but not limited to, the National
Arbitration Forum (NAF), the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Service (JAMS), the International Bar Association (IBA), the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), the American Bar
Association (ABA), the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA),
and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)."
86. Id. at 377.
87. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12 cmt. 4.
88. See generally NAF CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ARBITRATORS (2006), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/nafresources/CodeOfConductForArbitratorsl.pdf; JAMS,
JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE CLAUSES,
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2007), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration/consumer min std.asp; IBA GUIDELINES ON
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION (2004), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Arbitration-guidelines_2007.pdf; AAA/ABA
CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial-disputes.pdf; NAA CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MGMT. DISPUTES (2007), available at
http://www.naarb.org/code.html; FMCS CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR
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Beyond the myriad organizations are a plethora of ethical codes and
standards governing arbitrator conduct. Each of the codes and
standards vary considerably with respect to their language, rules, and
structure. Each set of standards tends to address conflicts and
disclosure at different places within the Code. Sources of authority
include the Rules of Professional Responsibility, the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act, the NAF's Judicial Codes of Conduct, District Court
General Rules of Practice such as Minnesota Rule 114, the
AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes,
and the NAA/FMCS/AAA Code of Professional Responsibility for
Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes.8 9
A. The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes
In attempting to isolate the information arbitrators need to know
to avoid sanctions and penalties for nondisclosure, one must be
mindful of the fact that ethical code provisions in and of themselves
may not be a safe harbor. Some of the ethical codes referenced above
expressly incorporate other rules and standards or they may simply
defer to other rules and standards. For example, the ABA/AAA Code
of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes states that "[aill
provisions of this Code should.., be read as subject to contrary
provisions of applicable law and arbitration rules... [and] subject to
contrary agreements of the parties. ' 9°
Nonetheless, several provisions of the ABA/AAA Code of Ethics
address issues of partiality and disclosure directly. Canon I requires
that the arbitrator "uphold the integrity and fairness of the arbitration
process" and suggests that an arbitrator should accept an appointment
only if he or she can serve impartially and independently of the
ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MGMT. DISPUTES (2007), available at
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categorylD=198&itemlD=16989 (all
discussing ethical standards for arbitrators).
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2007); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT
(2000); NAF CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ARBITRATORS (2006), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/CodeOfConductForArbitratorsl.pdf; MINN.
GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., CODE OF ETHICS R. II; AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial-disputes.pdf; NAA CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MGMT. DISPUTES (2007), available at
http://www.naarb.org/code.html; FMCS CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MGMT. DISPUTES (2007), available at
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categorylD=198&itemlD=16989.
90. AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES,
Note on Construction.
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parties, witnesses, and other arbitrators.91 The Code recommends that
the arbitrator "avoid entering into any business, professional, or
personal relationship, or acquiring any financial or personal interest,
which is likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably create
the appearance of partiality. ' 2 The Code also suggests that the
arbitrator should continue to avoid such conflicts of interest "If]or a
reasonable period of time after the decision of a case." 93 In addition to
avoiding conflicts of interest, the Code encourages arbitrators to
"avoid conduct and statements that give the appearance of partiality
toward or against any party." 94
Although the Code clearly states that conflicts of interest should
be avoided when possible, the Code makes clear that the existence of
such conflict "does not render it unethical for one to serve as an
arbitrator where the parties have consented to the arbitrator's
appointment or continued services following full disclosure.., in
accordance with Canon 11." 95 Canon II recommends disclosure of "any
interest or relationship likely to affect impartiality or which might
create an appearance of partiality" such as "[a]ny known direct or
indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of the
arbitration" and "[a]ny known existing or past financial, business,
professional or personal relationships which might reasonably affect
impartiality or lack of independence in the eyes of any of the parties.'" 96
A close examination of the language employed by the drafters reveals
the confusion that persists as to whether all conflicts that might create
the appearance of partiality or only those that reasonably affect
impartiality should be disclosed. The disclosure requirements under
the Code extend beyond conflicts of interest to include "[t]he nature
and extent of any prior knowledge [the arbitrator] may have of the
dispute" and "[a]ny other matters, relationships, or interests which
[the arbitrator is] obligated to disclose by the agreement of the
parties, the rules or practices of an institution, or applicable law
regulating arbitrator disclosure."'
The duty of disclosure defined by the code encompasses a duty to
investigate, which requires that arbitrators make "a reasonable effort
to inform themselves of any interests or relationships" that might taint
91. Id. Canon I(B).
92. Id. Canon I(C).
93. Id.
94. Id. Canon I(D).
95. Id. Canon I(C).
96. Id. Canon II(A)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
97. Id. Canon II(A)(3)-(4).
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their impartiality." The duty of disclosure is "a continuing duty which
requires.., an arbitrator to disclose, as soon as practicable, at any
stage of the arbitration, any such interests or relationships which may
arise, or which are recalled or discovered." 9 Echoing the sentiments
of Justice White's concurrence in Commonwealth, the Code declares
that "[a]ny doubt as to whether or not disclosure is to be made should
be resolved in favor of disclosure."" In addition to defining the
disclosures that are to be made under the Code, Canon II specifies
that disclosures should be communicated to all parties including other
arbitrators and reiterates the parties' right to select an arbitrator
despite his or her interests and relationships where the parties are
fully informed of those interests and relationships.' °1
In the event all parties request that the arbitrator withdraw, the
Code requires the arbitrator to do so.' ° If only one party requests
withdrawal due to allegations of partiality, the arbitrator is
encouraged to withdraw unless there exist established procedures for
challenging an arbitrator that have been defined within an agreement
between the parties, arbitration rule, or applicable law that must be
followed. 103 In the absence of such procedures, the arbitrator may
continue to serve only if he or she, after careful consideration,
determines that the basis for the challenge is not substantial and the
arbitrator still will be able decide the case impartially and fairly.' °4
Where compliance with these provisions would involve disclosure of
confidential or otherwise privileged information, the arbitrator must
either obtain consent to the disclosure or withdraw.
05
Although Canons I and II of the Code provide a wealth of
directly relevant information regarding disclosure, it does not
explicitly tell us what we need to disclose. It is unclear whether the
term "likely" (as it appears within Canon II in the phrase "likely to
affect impartiality") is to be understood as equivalent to the term
"reasonably" or is instead intended to include subjective
considerations. In addition, like other ethical codes, this one has other
relevant language regarding conflicts of interest appearing elsewhere
in the text. For example, Canon V states that "[a]n arbitrator should
98. Id. Canon 11(B).
99. Id. Canon H(C).
100. Id. Canon IH(D).
101. Id. Canon II(E)-(F).
102. Id. Canon 11(G).
103. Id. Canon II(G)(1).
104. Id. Canon II(G)(2).
105. Id. Canon II(H).
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decide all matters justly, exercising independent judgment, and should
not permit outside pressure to affect the decision." 6 Because of
inconsistent language, an arbitrator might be confused regarding
disclosure requirements even when one looks exclusively to a single
authority.
B. National Arbitration Forum Standards
Another authority providing guidance to arbitrators with respect
to conflicts of interest and disclosure requirements is the National
Arbitration Forum (NAF). The NAF not only has multiple provisions
within single documents but relevant language appears in several
documents. These documents include the Code of Conduct for
Arbitrators, the Arbitration Bill of Rights, which expressly
incorporates Judicial Codes of Conduct, and the Statement of
Principles. 7 The NAF Code of Conduct for Arbitrators begins with a
very general directive that arbitrators must "uphold the integrity and
fairness of the dispute resolution process."' ' Canon One states that
arbitrators "should treat all parties equally and conduct themselves in
a way that is fair to all parties... [and] should not be swayed by
outside pressure, by public clamor, by fear of criticism or by self
interest."1 9 The duties imposed under the Code of Conduct are
continuing in that "[tihe ethical obligations of an Arbitrator begin
upon appointment and continue throughout all stages of the
proceeding."'11 Ostensibly, this continuing duty encompasses the duty
to disclose as it is defined within Canon Two.
Canon Two states that "[a]n Arbitrator should disclose any
interest or relationship that affects impartiality or creates an
unfavorable appearance of partiality or bias" and thus "should avoid
entering into any financial, business, professional, family or social
relationship, or acquiring any financial or personal interest, that
adversely affects impartiality or might reasonably create the
106. Id. Canon V(B).
107. See NAF CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ARBITRATORS Canon 2 (2006), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/nafresources/CodeOfConductForArbitratorsl.pdf; NAF
ARBITRATION BILL OF RIGHTS WITH COMMENTARY princ. 3 (2007), available at
http://www.adrforum.comlusers/naf/resources/ArbitrationBillOfRights3.pdf; NAF
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 3-5 (2007), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/StatementPrinciples.pdf.
108. NAF CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ARBITRATORS Canon 1.
109. Id. Canon 1C.
110. Id. Canon 1G.
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unfavorable appearance of partiality or bias.".. The NAF Code of
Conduct appears to adopt the broad, absolute disclosure requirement
of the four justices in the Commonwealth plurality. It does, however,
encourage arbitrators to avoid only those dealings that would
"reasonably create the unfavorable appearance of partiality or bias.'. 2
So if you do not "avoid" the relationship because you do not believe it
"reasonably" creates an unfavorable appearance, you may still have to
disclose that relationship. Similarly, the latter portion of Canon Two
section A states that "[flor a reasonable period of time after a case,
Arbitrators should avoid entering into any such relationship, or
acquiring any such interest, in circumstances that might reasonably
create the impression that they had been influenced by the
anticipation or expectation of the relationship or interest." '113 Thus,
once again, if the arbitrator does not "avoid" a relationship or
interest, he or she may still have to disclose it.
Using language similar to that appearing in the AAA/ABA Code
of Ethics, the NAF Code of Conduct instructs arbitrators to disclose
"[a]ny financial, personal or material interest in the outcome of the
arbitration" as well as "[a]ny existing or past material, financial,
business, professional, family or social relationships that affect
impartiality or might reasonably create an unfavorable appearance of
partiality or bias... 4 Once again, arbitrators are left to wonder
whether they need to disclose anything that creates an appearance of
partiality or anything that "reasonably" creates an appearance of
impartiality. Although one can argue the latter based upon a
construction in which the subsequent language limits the preceding
terms, consistency probably is preferable.
Conversely, one also can argue that the broad Commonwealth
plurality standard controls. This interpretation is supported by the
language employed in section C of Canon Two, which states that
"[p]ersons asked to serve as Arbitrators should disclose any such
relationships they personally have with any Party, lawyer or individual
whom they understand will be a witness. They should also disclose any
such relationships involving immediate members of their families or
their current employers, partners or business associates.""' 5 Like its
counterparts, the NAF Code of Conduct requires that "[a]rbitrators
should make a reasonable effort to inform themselves of any interests
111. Id. Canon 2A.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id. Canon 2B(1)-(2).
115. Id. Canon 2C.
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or relationships" that might call into question the arbitrators'
partiality.116
In a departure from the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, the NAF
Code of Conduct recommends ("should"), but does not require
("shall"), withdrawal of an arbitrator where all parties request that the
arbitrator withdraw because of prejudice or bias.'17 Where fewer than
all parties request withdrawal of an Arbitrator due to prejudice or
bias, the arbitrator is encouraged to withdraw unless other rules
determining challenges are applicable; the arbitrator determines that
the reason for the request is insubstantial; or he or she remains able to
decide the case impartially and fairly, and 'withdrawal would cause
unfair delay or expense to another Party or would be contrary to the
ends of justice. 118 Although Canons One and Two address partiality
and disclosure requirements directly, Canon Four's confidentiality
requirements may also affect these issues. This provision requires that
the arbitrator be honest, trustworthy, and maintain confidentiality
such that he or she should not "use confidential information acquired
during the proceeding to gain personal advantage or advantage for
others, or to adversely affect the interest of another.""' 9
In a separate document called the Arbitration Bill of Rights, the
NAF appears to take a tougher stance on the question of arbitrator
conflicts and asserts that conflicts of interest are generally
impermissible 20 Relying upon the NAF Code of Procedure Rule 23,
Arbitration Bill of Rights Principle 3, Competent and Impartial
Arbitrators, states that "arbitrators are disqualified if they have a
conflict of interest or if circumstances exist which cause the arbitrator
to be unfair and biased. The standards used to determine conflicts and
bias of an arbitrator are the same standards used to determine
whether judges have a conflict or a bias.' ' 21 Although one might
question whether NAF truly means that the standards applied to
judges and arbitrators are equivalent, this provision suggests that local
codes of judicial conduct may also play a role in deciphering the
conflict and disclosure requirements to which arbitrators may be
subjected.
116. Id. Canon 2D.
117. Id. Canon 2G.
118. Id. Canon 2G(1)-(2).
119. Id. Canon 4A.
120. NAF ARBITRATION BILL OF RIGHTS WITH COMMENTARY 4 (2007), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/ArbitrationBillOfRights3.pdf.
121. Id.; see NAF CODE OF PROCEDURE R. 23 (2007), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/2007O80lCodeOfProcedure.pdf.
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Another publication of NAF called the Statement of Principles
declares that persons serving on NAF's nationwide panel of
arbitrators and mediators are bound by the Code of Conduct
discussed above.22 According to this document, NAF arbitrators are
"required to disclose the existence of interests or relationships that
are likely to affect their impartiality or that might reasonably create a
material appearance that they are biased against one party or
favorable to another."' 3 The Statement of Principles also reminds
readers that judicial oversight of arbitrator impartiality exists in the
form of vacatur as a remedy for arbitrator bias under the Federal
Arbitration Act and several state arbitration statutes.24
The Statement of Principles refers to yet another document
issued by the NAF known as the Code of Procedure, which presents
various circumstances in which "arbitrators will be disqualified for
conflict of interest or bias.' ' 125 Among the provisions within the NAF
Code of Procedure relevant to issues of partiality and disclosure are
Rules 5, 20, 21, and 23.
Rule 5 defines arbitrator qualifications and states that "[a]
neutral Arbitrator shall not serve if circumstances exist that create a
conflict of interest or cause the Arbitrator to be unfair or biased in
accord with Rules 21 and 23. A Forum Arbitrator may also be
removed similar to the ways a judge or juror may be stricken.' 26 Rule
20 requires that arbitrators "take an oath.., and shall be neutral and
independent.' ' 27 Rule 21 of the Code of Procedure governs the
selection of arbitrators and allows parties to strike arbitrators from a
selected panel, remove a selected arbitrator through a peremptory
challenge, and in some circumstances select an arbitrator of their
choosing whether that individual is a member of the NAF panel or
not.'8 Rule 23 authorizes the disqualification of arbitrators for a
variety of reasons related to personal bias, relationships with a party,
or other material circumstances creating the appearance of bias. It
provides in part:
122. NAF STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 3 (2007), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/StatementPrinciples.pdf.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. NAF CODE OF PROCEDURE R. 5F.
127. Id. R. 20B.
128. Id. R. 21 (explaining that "[ejach Party... may strike one of the candidates
[provided by the Forum] and may Request disqualification of any candidate in accord with
Rule 23C by notifying the Forum in Writing, within ten (10) days of the date of the strike
list"); see also NAF STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 3.
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An Arbitrator shall be disqualified if circumstances exist that
create a conflict of interest or cause the Arbitrator to be unfair
or biased, including but not limited to the following:
(1) The Arbitrator has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a Party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts;
(2) The Arbitrator has served as an attorney to any Party,
the Arbitrator has been associated with an attorney who
has represented a Party during that association, or the
Arbitrator or an associated attorney is a material witness
concerning the matter before the Arbitrator;
(3) The Arbitrator, individually or as a fiduciary, or the
Arbitrator's spouse or minor child residing in the
Arbitrator's household, has a direct financial interest in a
matter before the Arbitrator;
(4) The Arbitrator, individually or as a fiduciary, or the
Arbitrator's spouse or minor child residing in the
Arbitrator's household, has a direct financial interest in a
Party;
(5) The Arbitrator or the Arbitrator's spouse or minor child
residing in the Arbitrator's household has a significant
personal relationship with any Party or a Representative
for a Party; or
(6) The Arbitrator or the Arbitrator's spouse:
a. Is a Party to the proceeding, or an officer, director,
or trustee of a Party; or,
b. Is acting as a Representative in the proceeding. 2 9
Rule 23 also imposes upon the arbitrator a duty to disclose to the
NAF circumstances creating a potential conflict of interest and then
requires disqualification or disclosure of the information provided to
the parties. " In the event that a party wishes to request the
disqualification of an arbitrator, a "Written Request stating the
circumstances and specific material reasons for the disqualification"
129. NAF CODE OF PROCEDURE R. 23A.
130. Id. R. 23B. Rule 23B provides:
An Arbitrator shall provide the Forum with a complete and accurate
resume, a copy of which the Forum shall provide the Parties at the time of
the selection process. An Arbitrator shall disclose to the Forum
circumstances that create a conflict of interest or cause an Arbitrator to be
unfair or biased. The Forum shall disqualify an Arbitrator or shall inform
the Parties of information disclosed by the Arbitrator if the Arbitrator is not
disqualified.
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must be filed.' Timely filing of this request is critical because "[a]
Party who fails to timely and properly disclose disqualifying
circumstances agrees to accept the Arbitrator and waives any
subsequent objection to the Arbitrator in the pending arbitration or
any other legal proceeding.', 3 2 Pursuant to Rule 23, the "Request to
disqualify an Arbitrator must be filed with the Forum within ten (10)
days from the date of the Notice of Arbitrator selection. '133 When a
timely filing is made, the NAF reviews the request and will disqualify
the arbitrator "if there exist circumstances requiring disqualification
in accord with Rule 23A or other material circumstances creating bias
or the appearance of bias.'
34
As noted above, both the Bill of Rights and the Code of
Procedure require arbitrators to disclose circumstances "that create a
conflict or bias"' 5 or "create a conflict of interest or cause an
Arbitrator to be unfair or biased.' ' 6 The Statement of Principles,
however, states that arbitrators are "required to disclose the existence
of interests or relationships that are likely to affect their impartiality
or that might reasonably create a material appearance that they are
biased against one party or favorable to another."'37 An arbitrator
reading these provisions might be uncertain as to whether any conflict
must be disclosed or whether only those conflicts that might
reasonably create a material appearance of bias need to be disclosed.
Not only may this inconsistent language create confusion for neutrals,
it allows a reviewing court to emphasize whichever language it
chooses, thus creating uncertainty and unpredictability as to whether
evident partiality sufficient for vacatur exists.
C. Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct
In Preceding Section B, we observed that the NAF Arbitration
Bill of Rights Principle 3, Competent and Impartial Arbitrators,
declares that "[t]he standards used to determine conflicts and bias of
an arbitrator are the same standards used to determine whether
131. Id. R. 23C.
132. Id.
133. Id. R. 23D.
134. Id.
135. NAF ARBITRATION BILL OF RIGHTS WITH COMMENTARY 4 (2007), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/ArbitrationBillOfRights3.pdf.
136. NAF CODE OF PROCEDURE R. 23B (2007), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/200708OlCodeOfProcedure.pdf.
137. NAF STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 3 (2007), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/StatementPrinciples.pdf.
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judges have a conflict or a bias.' 38 Express incorporation of judicial
standards may create additional obligations for arbitrators.
The Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, for example, mandates
that judges perform their duties impartially and diligently.139 Canon 3
provides in part:
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
including but not limited to instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as lawyer in the matter in controversy,
or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law
served during such association as a lawyer concerning the
matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material
witness concerning it;
(c) the judge knows that he or she, individually or as a
fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, significant other, parent or
child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's
family residing in the judge's household, has an economic
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to
the proceeding, or has any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding.
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse or significant other or a
person within the third degree of relationship to any of
them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director
or trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that
could be substantially affected by the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding.
(e) the judge, while a judge or a candidate for judicial
office, has made a public statement that commits the judge
with respect to:
(i) an issue in the proceeding; or
(ii) the controversy in the proceeding.
4 0
Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that "[a] judge
138. NAF ARBITRATION BILL OF RIGHTS WITH COMMENTARY 4.
139. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(5) (2008).
140. Id. Canon 3D(1).
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shall not solicit funds for any educational, religious, charitable,
fraternal or civic organization. ' .4' With respect to their financial
activities, judges are not permitted to "serve as an officer, director,
manager, general partner, advisor or employee of any business
entity.', 4 2 In addition, the Code places various restrictions on a judge's
ability to accept gifts from others. 143 While the requirements specified
within the Code are rather stringent, the commentary sometimes
softens the restrictions. For example, the comments pertaining to gift
restrictions referenced above acknowledge that "[a] judge cannot...
reasonably be expected to know or control all of the financial or
business activities of all family members residing in the judge's
household."'" However, in the context of partiality, the commentary
provides that "a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, regardless whether any of the
specific rules in Section 3D(1) apply."'45
Arbitrators familiar with the conflicts of interest and disclosure
rules of arbitral associations may be surprised by the breadth and
range of judicial rules. Judicial conduct codes expressly incorporated
into an arbitral association's code of conduct may require disclosure
and even disqualification in circumstances that would not be
problematic under the arbitral code. It is not unusual for arbitrators to
serve only occasionally as arbitrators and to have other full-time
employment. It might come as news to NAF arbitrators in Minnesota,
for instance, that they may be subject to disqualification under judicial
conduct rules because they helped raise money for their church, their
child's school, or a girl/boy scout troop-in spite of the fact that those
entities have absolutely no connection to a particular case or to the
parties involved.
Like its Minnesota counterpart, the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct applies an objective partiality standard declaring that "[a]
judge shall disqualify himself or herself... [when] the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."'4 6 The ABA Model
Code permits a judge who would otherwise be disqualified to continue
participating where, following disclosure, the parties and their lawyers
agree that the judge should not be disqualified provided the basis for
141. Id. Canon 4C(3)(b).
142. Id. Canon 4D(3).
143. Id. Canon 4D(5).
144. Id. Canon 4D(5) cmt.
145. Id. Canon 3D(1) cmt.
146. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/2004 CodeofJudicial-Conduct.pdf.
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disqualification is not personal bias or knowledge of disputed facts.47
In contrast, the NAF Code of Conduct states only that the
arbitrator "should," rather than "shall," withdraw if all parties ask him
or her to do so because of bias.'48 Yet the removal procedures included
within NAF's Arbitration Bill of Rights suggest that withdrawal of the
arbitrator may be mandatory in these circumstances, in spite of the
fact that the Code of Conduct uses only the word "should.', 49 The Bill
of Rights states that "each party may request that an arbitrator be
disqualified and removed. These procedures are similar or identical to
the removal of judges. Arbitrators are required to disclose
circumstances that create a conflict or bias .... Arbitrators are
removed at the request of a party in accordance with these
procedures." 5 '
Although arbitral forums may believe it is advantageous to adopt
judicial codes, it is interesting to note that in Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., Justice White's concurrence
declares that "[t]he Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to
be held to the standards of judicial decorum of Article III judges, or
indeed of any judges.'
51'
D. Rules of Professional Responsibility
The NAF Bill of Rights specifies that arbitrators are subject to its
provisions as well as those of "the [NAF] Code of Conduct and any
local Code of Ethics for arbitrators."'52 Although the Rules of
Professional Responsibility cannot necessarily be described as a "local
Code of Ethics for arbitrators," these standards often apply to
neutrals and certainly do apply if the neutral is an attorney (as are all
the members of the NAF, for example). The Rules generally are
drafted to address issues arising in the practice of law. Some of the
language, however, is applicable in the arbitration context. Minnesota
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.12(a), for instance, declares that "a
lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in
which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a
147. Id. Canon 3E(1) cmt.
148. NAF CODE OF CONDUCr FOR ARBITRATORS Canon 2G (2006), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/CodeOfConductForArbitratorsl.pdf.
149. NAF ARBITRATION BILL OF RIGHTS WITH COMMENTARY 4 (2007), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/ArbitrationBillOfRights3.pdf.
150. Id.
151. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968)
(White, J., concurring).
152. NAF ARBITRATION BILL OF RIGHTS WITH COMMENTARY 11.
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judge.., or as an arbitrator, mediator, or other third-party neutral,
unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed
in writing....3 The Rule provides an example of a required disclosure
regarding one's work as an arbitrator, but in the context of the
arbitrator's role as an attorney."' Subsection (c) of the same Rule
expands the scope of the disqualification to other lawyers within the
same firm unless the disqualified attorney is timely screened,
apportioned no part of the fees obtained through the representation,
and written notice of the relationship is given to the parties and any
appropriate tribunal."'
The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct also require that:
A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform
unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party
does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer
shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-
party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a
client.
1 6
Thus the Rules of Professional Conduct impose an affirmative duty on
arbitrators, at least attorneys acting as arbitrators, and define a
required disclosure.
E. Minnesota Rule 114
Although the Rules of Professional Conduct may not be "any
local Code of Ethics for arbitrators," as described in the NAF Bill of
Rights, rules such as Rule 114 of the Minnesota General Rules of
Practice for the District Courts do match that description. The Code
of Ethics Appendix addresses conflicts of interest and requires that:
A neutral shall disclose all actual and potential conflicts of
interest reasonably known to the neutral. After disclosure, the
neutral shall decline to participate unless all parties choose to
retain the neutral. The need to protect against conflicts of
interest shall govern conduct that occurs during and after the
dispute resolution process. Without the consent of all parties,
and for a reasonable time under the particular circumstances, a
neutral who also practices in another profession shall not
establish a professional relationship in that other profession
with one of the parties, or any person or entity, in a substantially
153. MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12(a) (2007).
154. Id. R. 1.12 cmt. 2.
155. Id. R. 1.12(c).
156. Id. R. 2.4(b).
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factually related matter. 157
The broad, absolute language of this rule, "all actual and
potential conflicts of interest," is devoid of references to relationships
and conflicts that would "reasonably create the appearance of
partiality."'' 8 The disclosure requirement is all-encompassing. Neutrals
acting under an arbitral institutional code of ethics that expressly
requires disclosure only of the those conflicts that create a reasonable
appearance of bias nonetheless will be required to make more
comprehensive disclosures if that arbitral code incorporates a rule
similar to Minnesota Rule 114. Furthermore, it appears that regardless
of the nature or magnitude of the conflict, a neutral cannot serve
unless he or she has express consent.
Neutrals cannot presume that the breadth of their disclosure
requirements will be fully described by the language contained within
the relevant arbitral institutional code. Neutrals first must determine
whether external codes or statutes have been incorporated into their
arbitral code. They then must decide what that external guidance
requires and, if there is any inconsistency, which code or statute is
controlling. The prudent choice, of course, is to assume that the most
demanding language will be controlling.
The stringent disclosure requirements in Minnesota Rule 114 are
tempered, however, by an objective definition of knowledge that
demands an arbitrator disclosure only those conflicts that are
"reasonably known."'5 9 Nevertheless, it appears that regardless of
whether a conflict of interest is actual or potential, a neutral cannot
serve without the express consent of the parties.
The introduction to the Code of Ethics states that "[v]iolation of
a provision of this Code shall not create a cause of action nor shall it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached."' 6 The
introduction goes on to note that "[n]othing in this Code should be
deemed to establish or augment any substantive legal duty on the part
of neutrals.' 16' Thus, the language appears to suggest that there are no
157. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., CODE OF ETHICS R. II.
158. Id.; see, e.g., AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES Canon I(C) (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial-disputes.pdf ("After accepting appointment
and while serving as an arbitrator, a person should avoid entering into any business,
professional, or personal relationship, or acquiring any financial or personal interest, which
is likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably create the appearance of
partiality.").
159. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., CODE OFETHICS R. II.
160. Id. intro.
161. Id.
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real consequences for violating the ADR Code of Ethics in
Minnesota. However, the Code of Ethics enforcement provisions
provide that sanctions may be imposed if supported by clear and
convincing evidence.62 These provisions define sanctions allowing
authorities to:
(1) Issue a private reprimand.
(2) Designate the corrective action necessary for the neutral to
remain on the roster.
(3) Notify the appointing court and any professional licensing
authority with which the neutral is affiliated of the complaint
and its disposition.
(4) Publish the neutral's name, a summary of the violation, and
any sanctions imposed.
(5) Remove the neutral from the roster of qualified neutrals,
163and set conditions for reinstatement if appropriate.
F. IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration
The International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of
Interest in International Arbitration were prepared by a panel of
nineteen experts representing fourteen countries.'" The guidelines
demand that "[i]f facts or circumstances exist that may, in the eyes of
the parties, give rise to doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or
independence, the arbitrator shall disclose such facts or
circumstances.' 65 Although the IBA Guidelines adopt a subjective
test for disclosure, an objective test is applied with respect to
disqualification. The Guidelines demand that an arbitrator decline or
discontinue participation "if he or she has any doubts as to his or her
ability to be impartial or independent... [or] if facts or circumstances
exist ... that, from a reasonable third person's point of view.., give
rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or
independence. ' ' 166
A unique and helpful feature of the IBA Guidelines is that the
document provides specific examples detailing when disclosure can,
and cannot, cure an apparent conflict of interest.' 67 The IBA has
162. Id. R. II.
163. Id.
164. IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION 3 (2004),
available at http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Arbitration-guidelines-2007.pdf.
165. Id. at 9.
166. Id. at 7-8.
167. Id. at 27.
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developed several lists categorizing various scenarios and the
corresponding action that may be appropriately taken by the
arbitrator who encounters such a situation. These lists include the
Non-Waivable Red List, which covers situations that give rise to such
significant justifiable doubts as to impartiality (from the perspective of
a reasonable third person) that disclosure cannot cure; the Waivable
Red List, which covers serious but less severe conflicts that can be
expressly waived if and when the parties are made aware of the
conflict; the Orange List, which encompasses cases that may give rise
to justifiable doubts and may be waived by the parties if disclosure is
made and no objections follow; and the Green List, which includes
situations in which there is no actual or apparent conflict and thus no
duty to disclose.1 6
G. Case Law Review
The rules, codes, and statutory material discussed thus far
provide so many recommendations and mandates concerning conflicts
of interest and disclosure that it can be difficult for arbitrators to
know exactly what must be disclosed, the extent to which they must
investigate to discover conflicts, and the consequences if they fail to
make a required disclosure. But in addition to understanding the wide
range of arbitral institutional and Supreme Court regulatory and
ethical dictates that may be applicable, arbitrators also must
comprehend and comply with the disclosure requirements that courts
are articulating. Again, the problem is that those articulations do not
provide consistent guidance. Some courts are very concerned about
the parties' needs and desires to be as fully informed as possible and
stand willing to vacate decisions based on the mere appearance of
partiality. Other courts, however, have declared more restrictive
standards for vacatur.
California courts have been particularly active concerning
conflicts of interest and disclosure issues. In Ovitz v. Schulman, a
California court of appeal upheld an order vacating an arbitration
award based upon a failure to disclose.169 The court concluded that the
FAA provisions permitting vacatur upon a showing of "evident
partiality" by the arbitrator did not preempt an applicable state
statute permitting an arbitration award to be vacated based upon the
arbitrator's failure to comply in a timely fashion with state standards
168. Id. at 20-25.
169. Ovitz v. Schulman, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 136 (Ct. App. 2005).
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applicable to contractual arbitration proceedings that required
disclosure of possible grounds for disqualification.7 The court found
that the language of the FAA strongly suggests that sections 10 and 12
of the statute apply only in federal court.171 Furthermore, the court
determined that the relevant California statute was not inconsistent
with the purpose of the FAA to encourage private arbitration as a
means of resolving disputes."'
In Azteca Construction v. ADR Consulting, another California
appellate court reversed an order denying a petition to vacate based
upon the court's finding that the parties could not waive a California
Arbitration Act provision related to disqualification of arbitrators in
favor of an AAA rule granting the organization conclusive authority
to resolve challenges to the selection of an arbitrator.' The court
determined that the arbitrator's failure to disqualify himself following
Azteca's timely demand for such disqualification was a violation of
California law 74 and noted that "the neutrality of the arbitrator is of
such crucial importance that the Legislature cannot have intended
that its regulation be delegable to the unfettered discretion of a
private business."'75
In International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees v.
Laughon, a California appellate court reversed a lower court decision
affirming an arbitration award where the arbitrator failed to disclose
his service as a neutral in a prior proceeding in which another union
was represented by the same law firm representing the union in the
current case. 176 The court relied on various sections within the
California Code of Civil Procedure including section 1286.2
subdivision (a)(6)(A) to conclude that vacatur was required under the
circumstances because the arbitrator had "failed to disclose.., a
ground for disqualification of which the arbitrator was then aware.' 77
170. Id. at 119, 136.
171. Id. at 132-33.
172. Id. at 134-35.
173. Azteca Constr., Inc. v. ADR Consulting, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 151 (Ct. App.
2004).
174. Id. at 146-47.
175. Id. at 150.
176. Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving Picture Mach. Operators
of the U.S. & Can., Local No. 16 v. Laughon, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 341, 343 (Ct. App. 2004).
177. Id. at 345. "Section 1281.9, subdivision (b), provides that a 'proposed neutral
arbitrator shall disclose all matters required to be disclosed pursuant to this section to all
parties in writing within 10 calendar days of service of notice of the proposed nomination
or appointment."' Id. Subdivision (a)(4) of section 1281.9 requires disclosure of "[t]he
names of the parties to all prior or pending noncollective bargaining cases involving any
party to the arbitration or lawyer for a party for which the proposed neutral arbitrator
SO UTH TEXAS LA W REVIEW
California, of course, is not the only jurisdiction confronted with
conflicts of interest and disclosure issues. In Crow Construction Co. v.
Jeffrey M. Brown Associate Inc., a United States District Court in
Pennsylvania resolved the parties' conflicting interpretations of the
term "evident partiality" by adopting an approach based upon the
Supreme Court's opinion in Commonwealth Coatings.7 8 According to
the district court, in Commonwealth Coatings the Supreme Court
determined that "'evident partiality' is established when arbitrators
fail to disclose 'any dealings that might create an impression of
possible bias.' '1 7 9 Based on that understanding, the district court
rejected an argument that "evident partiality is present only when 'a
reasonable person would have to conclude that the arbitrator was
partial' to the other party to the arbitration.'" Implicitly equating the
objective "reasonable person" standard with one requiring actual bias,
the court went on to hold that the Commonwealth Coatings
appearance of bias standard should be applied in the instant case
because "[r]egardless of whether a court considers the actual bias
standard to be legitimate.., such a standard does not apply in
cases.., where (1) the parties have some influence in selecting their
arbitrators and (2) an arbitrator failed to disclose information which
may create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator's partiality." '181
In Houston Village Builders, Inc. v. Falbaum, a Texas appellate
court upheld an order vacating an arbitration award granted by an
arbitrator who failed to disclose an attorney-client relationship with a
builders association of which a party to the arbitration was a
member. 182 The court held that despite indirect references to the
relationship between the arbitrator and the builders association in the
resume and disclosure letter provided to the parties, the disclosures
made were "not sufficient to inform the parties that the Arbitrator
was in an attorney-client relationship with the GHBA at the time of
the arbitration. ,113 The court also expressed its support for an
served or is serving as neutral arbitrator." Id. (quotations marks omitted).
178. Crow Constr. Co. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc. Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220-21
(E.D. Pa. 2003).
179. Id. at 220 (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S.
145, 149 (1968)).
180. Id. (quoting Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1523 n.30 (3d Cir.
1994)).
181. Id. at 222.
182. 105 S.W.3d 28, 30 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
183. Id. at 34. The arbitrator disclosed his membership in the builders association and,
in the resume he submitted to the parties, there was a reference to an article authored by
the arbitrator that included an endnote stating that the arbitrator served as counsel to the
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objective interpretation of the evident partiality standard stating that
"[t]he proper test is not whether the undisclosed information would,
in fact, create the appearance of bias. Rather, the court must
determine whether an objective observer would believe the
information might create that appearance. ' 8'
In Mariner Financial Group, Inc. v. Bossley, the Texas Supreme
Court upheld an appellate court's decision to deny summary judgment
to a party seeking to avoid vacatur of an arbitration award. The court
based its holding on the arbitrator's evident partiality resulting from a
failure to disclose that a party's expert witness had previously testified
against the arbitrator in a malpractice action. '85 Relying upon the
plurality opinion in Commonwealth Coatings, the Texas Supreme
Court adopted a subjective "appearance of partiality" standard to
conclude that "[i]t is well-established ... that a neutral arbitrator has a
duty to disclose dealings of which he or she is aware that might create
an impression of possible bias. 186 In addition, the court also
referenced provisions of the NASD Code that impose a duty to
disclose "relationships that 'might reasonably create an appearance of
partiality or bias,"' and those that require the arbitrator to "make a
'reasonable effort' to inform themselves of such relationships." '187
These requirements, the court concluded, indicate "there is no
justification for the concurrence to shift the burden of disclosure from
the arbitrator to a party.,
188
Although one can find many cases illustrating the courts'
willingness to vacate arbitration awards for failure to disclose a
conflict of interest, there also are many decisions revealing that courts
do not take such action lightly. In DeBaker v. Shah, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed a lower court order granting a motion to
vacate based upon the arbitrator's evident partiality resulting from his
receipt of campaign contributions from members of the law firm
representing one of the parties to the proceeding.189 The court found
several facts determinative. First, the attorneys who contributed to the
campaign did not personally represent Shah.1'9 Additionally, a record
of the contributions was available to the public and could have been
board of directors of the builders association. Id.
184. Id. at 33 n.2.
185. Mariner Fin. Group, Inc. v. Bossley, 79 S.W.3d 30, 30-31 (Tex. 2002).
186. Id. at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Id. (quoting NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 10312(a)-(b)).
188. Id.
189. DeBaker v. Shah, 533 N.W.2d 464, 464-65 (Wis. 1995).
190. Id. at 469.
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obtained by the DeBakers with little effort on their part.191 In
upholding the arbitration award, the court expressly rejected the
evident partiality standard adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in School District of Spooner v. Northwest United Educators, which
had established a per se rule requiring a finding of evident partiality
"any time an arbitrator fails to disclose employment with a party or an
entity that supplies counsel to a party.,
192
The Debarker court rejected the Spooner court's reasoning that
"a finding of evident partiality may be based on any undisclosed facts
which are evidence of impartiality [sic]; actual impartiality or facts
from which partiality is a foregone conclusion are not required." '193
Instead, the Debarker court imposed a heightened burden upon the
party seeking vacatur. The court declared that the "the standard for
proving the invalidity of an award is met only upon a showing by the
proponent that there exists clear and convincing evidence that the
arbitrator in question demonstrated 'evident partiality." '194 "'[E]vident
partiality' exists only when a reasonable person knowing the
previously undisclosed information would have had 'such doubts'
regarding the impartiality of the arbitrator that the person would have
taken action on the information.'
'195
In Lucent Technologies Inc. v. Tatung Co., the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld an
arbitration award against a motion to vacate on grounds of partiality
where an arbitrator previously had served as an expert witness on
behalf of a party to the arbitration.' 96 In so holding, the court
explained that the proper test of evident partiality is neither an
"appearance of bias" nor a "proof of actual bias" standard.'97 The
court went on to clarify the proper test for evident partiality and its
justification for adopting this approach:
"[E]vident partiality" within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10 will
be found where a reasonable person would have to conclude
that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration....
[I]n assessing a given relationship, courts must remain cognizant
of peculiar commercial practices and factual variances.... In
this way,.., the courts may refrain from threatening the
191. Id.
192. Id. at 467-68.
193. Id. at 467 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting School Dist. of Spooner v. Nw.
United Educators, 401 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Wis. 1987)).
194. Id. at 468.
195. Id.
196. Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Tatung Co., 379 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2004).
197. Id. at 31.
[Vol. 49:879
2008] CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND DISCLOSURES 917
valuable role of private arbitration in the settlement of
commercial disputes, and at the same time uphold their
responsibility to ensure that fair treatment is afforded to those
who come before them.198
In Guseinov v. Burns, another California appellate court upheld
an arbitration award granted in favor of the plaintiff after the
arbitrator failed to disclose a prior relationship with an attorney
representing a party to the arbitration.99 The court reasoned a
California law requiring neutral arbitrators to "disclose all matters
that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a
doubt that the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be
impartial."2" did not require the arbitrator to disclose he had served as
an unpaid, volunteer mediator in a prior proceeding in which the
plaintiff's attorney represented a party.2°'
In Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co., the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan was not persuaded by the
argument that evident partiality required the court to vacate an
arbitration award given to the widow of a victim in a forklift
accident.2°2 The court held while the allegations of fraud and evident
partiality made by the defendant were appropriate bases for vacatur
pursuant to section 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act, the
defendant had failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a
finding of evident partiality or fraud.2 3 Instead, the defendant merely
had shown the arbitrator and plaintiff's attorney had appeared in the
same lawsuits together on various occasions representing different
parties and had on two occasions jointly represented a personal injury
plaintiff 2 These connections, the court reasoned, were insufficient to
establish the type of relationship or conflict necessary to justify
vacatur. 205
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Home Insurance Co., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the
question of what standard to apply when evaluating allegations of
evident partiality.2 6 The court rejected Nationwide's reliance on the
198. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Morelite Constr.
Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984)).
199. Guseinov v. Burns, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 903, 905 (Ct. App. 2006).
200. Id. at 912.
201. Id. at 916.
202. Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 899, 908 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
203. Id. at 906.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 907.
206. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 643-47 (6th Cir. 2005).
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Commonwealth plurality standard by which vacatur is required where
the arbitrator's failure to disclose raises either a "reasonable
impression of bias" or "appearance of bias."2 °7 Instead the court
elected to apply the objective standard articulated in Apperson v. Fleet
Carrier Corp., which rejected the Commonwealth plurality's
"appearance of bias" standard in favor of one in which "evident
partiality 'will be found where a reasonable person would have to
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the
arbitration '' 208 Applying the Apperson standard, the court found that
neither the arbitrator's fully disclosed ongoing contacts with Home
Insurance nor his failure to disclose his social contacts with Home
Insurance Company representatives would cause a reasonable person
to doubt the arbitrator's ability to resolve the dispute in an impartial
manner.29
Finally, in Power Services Associates, Inc. v. UNC Metcalf
Servicing, Inc., the court upheld an arbitration award despite the
arbitrator's failure to disclose his prior representation of a party's
parent corporation nearly 40 years ago.210 Under these circumstances,
the court reasoned, the relationship between the arbitrator and the
party's parent corporation was "too remote" to demand disclosure.1
Furthermore, the court reasoned even if disclosure had been required,
Power Services Associates failed to meet the heavy burden of proof
required to establish evident partiality, which the court maintained
"must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than
remote, uncertain and speculative." '212
III. CONCLUSION
The diversity of opinions expressed by the courts confirms the
considerable disagreement within the legal and arbitral communities
regarding what disclosures are required, which conflicts and
relationships are permissible, and how the concept of 'evident
partiality' should be interpreted so as to provide a clear standard for
arbitrators, parties, and the courts themselves. Although a standard
requiring disclosure of every known, unknown but discoverable, or
207. Id. at 644.
208. Id. at 645 (quoting Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenters
Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984)).
209. Id. at 648-49.
210. Power Servs. Assocs., Inc. v. UNC Metcalf Servicing, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 1375,
1380 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
211. Id. at 1382.
212. Id. at 1381.
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merely potential conflict of interest does establish a bright line,
competing interests and values have encouraged at least some courts,
and codes of conduct generally, to reject such a demanding standard.
The willingness of arbitrators to serve, for example, and recognition
that such comprehensive disclosure often is not realistic given
memory, knowledge, and judgment lapses to which all human beings
are susceptible are among the reasons for rejecting such a broad
standard.
Because failing to disclose a conflict of interest can have serious
consequences, including vacatur of the arbitral award, arbitrators
must acquire a thorough understanding of the various statutory
directives and ethical codes that are applicable. Arbitrators must
familiarize themselves with not only the rules of the arbitral
association with which they are affiliated, but any professional or
statutory standards that have been incorporated into those rules either
expressly or by implication. And, of course, arbitrators must look
closely at the agreement to arbitrate not only to determine whether
the agreement includes additional disclosure requirements but to
discern the exact parameters of those requirements. Moreover,
arbitrators must be familiar with the common law rules and principles
that guide courts in determining whether vacatur is justified on the
basis of evident partiality.
Courts recognize the federal policy favoring arbitration and
generally appreciate that their rulings can create significant burdens
for arbitrators. Many courts not only acknowledge the inherent trade-
off between impartiality and expertise that exists in a dispute
resolution system where the neutral may be expected to bring a
valuable industry or insider perspective, but expressly make that
trade-off a factor in their analysis and decision-making process. Yet
whether a court applies a subjective standard of evident partiality
under which the arbitrator must disclose conflicts that create the mere
appearance of bias, or an objective standard in which the arbitrator
must disclose conflicts and relationships that would cause a reasonable
person to infer bias, still depends upon the jurisdiction. Ultimately,
the decision to set aside an arbitration award will be highly dependent
upon the specific factual circumstances in which the failure to disclose
takes place. Although it may not be feasible to predict with absolute
precision the outcome in any given situation, knowledge of the
relevant standards and laws will in many cases enable an arbitrator to
recognize which disclosures are required and, thereby, avoid vacatur.
The existing myriad of relevant guidance, regulations, and
judicial decisions concerning conflicts of interest and required
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
disclosures is not only frustrating but can result in the nuclear option
of the arbitral world, vacatur. Arbitral institutions such as the
American Arbitration Association and the National Arbitration
Forum must be vigilant to ensure their codes, standards, and bills of
rights do not articulate inconsistent standards as to what conflicts of
interest must be disclosed and the consequences of both disclosure
(such as removal) and failure to disclose (such as sanctions). Whether
arbitral institutions adopt external ethics codes and codes of conduct
(such as judicial codes and local ethics codes) merely to assure
potential clients that their arbitration services are as ethical and
trustworthy as any dispute resolution process available, or whether
institutions adopt the codes in order to benefit from ethical codes that
already have been carefully vetted and scrutinized, incorporation of
external codes can create obligations inconsistent with the arbitral
association's own codes and incompatible with the goals and realities
of arbitration. A call for the courts to adopt a more uniform standard
for determining when a failure to disclose a conflict of interest will
result in evident partiality warranting vacatur may not be answered
any time soon. But there is no reason why arbitral institutions cannot
review and, if necessary, amend their own codes and
recommendations to ensure that their expectations concerning conflict
of interest and disclosures are defined as clearly as possible.
Until then, we still are talking about a mountain rather than a
molehill. Arbitrators must be diligent and learn what codes and
recommendations apply and what those codes require. Arbitrators
also must understand how the courts in their jurisdiction are defining
conflicts of interest disclosure requirements.
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